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Psychoanalysts have suggested that a mentalization process is required for the 
transformation of drives and affects into mental representations of self and others. Meanwhile, 
neuroscientists suggest that episodic memory, through autonoetic consciousness, is crucially 
involved in the elaboration of the Self and subjective experience. This research empirically 
investigates the relationship between the quality of mentalization and the efficacy of 
autobiographical recall, and considers childhood trauma and psychopathology as possible 
related factors. Thirty participants presenting with either high or low mentalization profiles 
according to the Mental States Rating Systems (MSRS) were submitted to the TEMPau, a 
semi-structured interview designed to assess the quality of autobiographical recall from 
several criteria (episodicity, self-perspective and consciousness). Childhood trauma was 
assessed using the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ). The Symptom Checklist (SCL–
90-R) and the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Personality Disorders (SCID-II) 
were used to assess global symptomatology and Axis-II disorders respectively. As expected, 
levels of mentalization are related to higher levels of childhood abuse (emotional, physical and 
sexual) and symptomatology (SCL–90-R Global Severity Index). However, contrary to our 
expectation, better autobiographical memory is associated with poor mentalization profiles, 
although spontaneity of recall is less efficient in those subjects. No significant relation was 
found between Axis-II disorders and traits, and other clinical variables.
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A psychoanalytic contribution to the concept of the Self: Mentalization
The concept of mentalization, traditionally centered on the notion of 
transformation and elaboration of drives and affects into mental representations 
(Marty, 1990, 1996), has a long and fruitful history within the theoretical and 
clinical traditions of psychoanalysis. However, its various definitions complicate 
its measure and clinical application (De Tychey et al., 1997; Diwo, 1999). In 
addition, many overlapping and related concepts, such as emotional intelligence 
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(Bar-On, 2000; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2008) and reflective functioning 
(Fonagy, 1989; Fonagy & Target, 1996, 2000) have also recently emerged. 
These notions contributed to a deeper understanding of some aspects of 
mentalization, but also prompted questions about the conceptual boundaries of 
this crucial function in the creation of the human subjectivity and the Self. Bram 
and Gabbard (2001) suggest to limit the term “mentalization” to its classical 
conceptualization, originating from the French psychoanalytic tradition. For 
Marty (1990, 1996) mentalization first and foremost refers to the representational 
process itself, that is, the transformation of somatic drive/affect excitations 
into representable and ultimately symbolized mental contents. This elaborative 
work of the internal world and subsequent reflective thinking is considered 
as a primary factor in tolerating negative affects, thus preventing impulsive 
and excessive discharge through acting-outs (e.g. auto and hetero-aggressive 
behaviors, compulsive sexual activity, drug abuse, etc.) and/or psychosomatic 
disorganizations (Chemouni, 2000; De Tychey et al., 1997; Marty, 1990, 1996).
On the operational level, the mentalization process is particularly manifest 
in verbal productions, as clinicians witness successive shifts in mental states. 
According to Putnam (1988), state-related variables comprise, among other key 
elements, affects, access to personal memories and sense of self. For instance, 
in an affectively charged situation, we would consider as poorly mentalized the 
patient presenting a persistent state of concreteness, describing his affective 
experience in an anecdotal fashion and using words that only duplicate 
actions, thus resulting in an “empty presence”. Somatic discharges may also 
be observed. Defensive activity seriously distorting the subjective reality (e.g. 
denial, splitting), or secondarily prevent a meaningful symbolic content to gain 
consciousness and to be integrated into the personal history and/or identity is also 
considered an indication of poor mentalization. By contrast, the patient showing 
more reflexivity and insight, who is able to contain and explore in a relatively 
non-defensive manner his inner world and emotions or to use metaphors to 
symbolize his experience would be considered to show good mentalization. 
Therefore, mentalization has to do with both the quantity and the quality of 
emotionally significant mental representations of self and others, as part of the 
whole subjective experience. It also refers to the upholding and availability 
of these representations for thought processes, as well as to the permanence 
and fluidity of the associative function among them. It is this original view of 
mentalization that will be considered in the present project.
Observations documenting the relationships between mentalization and 
other clinical variables are numerous. Zanarini and Frankenburg (1997) found a 
positive association between a history of childhood trauma and poor mentalization 
among a group of personality disordered participants. Bouchard and colleagues 
(2008) found that poorly mentalized subjects have a higher number of DSM-IV 
diagnoses, over and above gender and attachment status. They also noted that 
the absence of a diagnosis (whether on axis I or II) increases a subject’s chance 
of being securely attached. Although attachment was not directly measured in 
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symptoms, and childhood trauma) were studied in relation to both mentalization 
and autobiographical memory.
A neuropsychological contribution to the concept of the Self:
Memory systems
In the widely accepted structural model of multiple memory systems 
(Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Schacter, Wagner, & Buckner, 2000; Tulving, 1983, 
1985), a system is defined as a set of correlated processes, each with its own 
logic regarding encoding, storage, consolidation and retrieval of information. 
In addition, each differs in terms of its underlying neurological substrates, the 
kind of information it processes and by specific operating rules and laws of 
functioning. Self-representations underlying identity and character necessarily 
involve long-term memory, which can be divided into two broad systems: 
procedural memory (of particular importance is the affective subsystem involving 
implicit processes, although motor and cognitive procedures may be embedded 
in a higher-order self-definition, but in a more peripheral sense) and declarative 
memory (including both explicit semantic and episodic contents).
In its narrower conceptualization, procedural memory implies cognitive 
(e.g. reading) and motor abilities (e.g. riding a bike). Representations created in 
this system are in themselves non-symbolic and cognitively hardly graspable, 
although one might exert a reflexive activity on them (e.g. I can tentatively 
describe explicitly how I proceed to ride a bike). The recall of encrypted 
memories in the procedural system is totally dependent on external stimulations 
that act as primes (e.g. being on my bike) for the encoded information. The 
form of consciousness associated with procedural recall is said to be anoetic; the 
person has no sense of a knowing or remembering process taking place (Siegel, 
1999; Tulving, 2002; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997).
Procedural memory also encompasses affective procedures, which includes 
classical conditioning as well as more complex affective schemes, such as core 
features of attachment patterns and object relations (Fosshage, 2005). Implicit 
affective memory is central to identity consolidation and can be viewed as one 
of the core layers of the self. Its relations to mentalization processes required 
further exploration. We shall here focus on “higher” layers of the Self, relying 
on explicit declarative memory.
Declarative memory is the umbrella term that designates a cognitively 
graspable material, which can be expressed in words, fantasies and memories 
(i.e. highly symbolic. Aspects of identity and character necessarily, but not 
exclusively, involve the use of the long-term declarative memory systems. 
Declarative memory is divided into two distinct but interrelated systems. The 
semantic system concerns factual knowledge. Its products are propositional 
representations concerning both the self (e.g. name and birth date) and the world 
(including abstract knowledge such as mathematics). It is the system of the so-
called objective thought; emotions play virtually no role in this system. The 
episodic memory system shares several characteristics with the semantic system, 
but also possesses unique features. As Tulving (2002, p.5) put it, “the essence MENTALIZATION AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 146
of episodic memory lies in the conjunction of three concepts – self, autonoetic 
awareness, and subjectively sensed time.” It allows events (or episodes) situated 
in time and space to be remembered by the subject. It also allows projection of 
the self in the future. Further, emotions and other phenomenological qualities of 
the event (e.g. sensations, cognitions, perceptions), are central to the subjective 
quality in the encoding of the experience. The products issued from the episodic 
system are remembered from an “actor-like perspective” (first person), while 
the facts of the semantic system are known and recalled from a “spectator-like 
perspective” (third person) (Piolino, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2000).
Mental representations pertaining to the self, engraved into semantic 
or episodic memory subsystems, are said to be autobiographical1. It has been 
suggested that richer episodic contents (i.e. characterized by more specificity and 
phenomenological details in comparison to decontextualized semantic contents), 
is an indication of the higher quality and efficacy of autobiographical memory. 
The term episodicity has been put forward to designate this characteristic. 
Taken at face value, a careful examination of both autobiographical memory 
and mentalization conceptual features has led us to believe that mentalization 
processes would contribute to key aspects of the quality of encoding and recall 
of emotionally charged episodes, and vice-versa.
The quality of mentalization and the efficacy of autobiographical recall
When a stimulation occurs (whether internal or external), specific sub-cortical 
structures of the limbic system (e.g. amygdala) and specialized cortical regions (e.g. 
orbitofrontal cortex) screen for emotional content and implication (Siegel, 1999). 
Contrary to highly emotional arousing events, experiences that involve lower 
emotional intensity seem not to trigger focal attention and thus are less likely to 
be experienced as “important” (Markowitsch, 2000). These memories are therefore 
not easily recalled later on, because explicit encoding has not occurred. However, 
if the event involves high stakes or is overwhelming (traumatic), numerous factors 
may inhibit activity in the structures involved in explicit encoding (particularly the 
hippocampus) and thus prevent subsequent retrieval as well. It is an inverted-U-
shaped-curve effect (Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1996; Nadel & Jacobs, 1998; Schooler & 
Eich, 2000). It has been shown that individuals that underwent severe traumatic 
experiences during childhood present with overgeneral autobiographical memory 
(Crane & Duggan, 2009; McNally et al., 2006).
On one hand, it is suggested that higher mentalization capacities may 
help to reduce the disruptive impact of negative affects at the neurological level 
during the encoding process. On the other hand, it is suggested that in individuals 
having at their disposal “thick” layers of symbolic self-representations that 
are permanently and fluidly interconnected (i.e. presenting high quality of 
mentalization), episodic encoding is further facilitated and enriched as a result 
of this highly contextualized network of information. At an empirical level, 
it is hypothesized that the quality of mentalization will be positively related 
1  Autobiographical memory is not a distinct memory system, but rather a particular way to 
designate the specific contents of representations.Julie Dauphin, Conrad Lecomte, Marc-André Bouchard, 
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to the efficacy of autobiographical recall, and that both mentalization and 
autobiographical recall will be negatively related to childhood trauma and to the 
presence and/or severity of psychopathology.
Method
Participants. Thirty (30) francophone participants (14 males and 16 females), aged 20 to 50 
years old, were recruited. Given the correlational design of this research, it was necessary to 
obtain participants with both high and low mentalization profiles. Therefore, in order to avoid 
variance restriction regarding mentalization, which would have prevented any results from 
being interpretable, clinical (53%) as well as non-clinical (47%) participants were included 
in the sample. The clinical participants would presumably present with lower mentalization 
profiles, and the non-clinical, with higher mentalization capacity.
Clinical participants were outpatients at (name of hospital – to be identified in the final 
version), a psychiatric institute located in Montréal (Canada), and were either participating in 
a long-term group psychotherapy for severe personality disorders or in a day-hospital intensive 
treatment program for anxiety and depressive disorders. The non-clinical participants were 
undergraduate psychology students or their relatives recruited at (First author’s University – 
to be added in the final version). Participant’s characteristics are presented in Table 1.
Exclusion criteria. Participants presenting with the following medical conditions, expected 
to interfere with long-term memory encoding and/or recall, were excluded from the project 
prior to or after a screening interview: 1) Severe alcoholism or drug abuse (Eiber, Puel, & 
Schmitt, 2000); 2) Post traumatic or acute stress disorder (Buckley, Blanchard, & Neil, 2000; 
McNally, Litz, Prassas, Shin, & Weathers, 1994); 3) A known history of head injury, brain 
damage, neurological disorder, severe pregnancy and prenatal complications or premature 
birth. Participants presenting with a score higher than 55/120 on Brown’s Attention Deficit 
Scale (ADD-A) (Brown, 1996/2001), indicating a high probability of presenting an attention 
deficit disorder, were also excluded; 4) Present or recent (12 months or less) electroconvulsive 
therapy (McElhiney, 1999; Peretti, Danion, Grangé, & Mobarek, 1996); 5) Chronic psychotic 
disorder (Riutort, Cuervo, Danion, Peretti, & Salame, 2003); 6) Present major depressive 
disorder (Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale, 2002; Sampson, Kinderman, Watts, & Sembi, 2003; 
Wessel, Meeren, Peeters, Arntz, & Merckelbach, 2001).
Instruments and Measures
The Autobiographical Memory Task. The TEMPau (in French, Test Épisodique de Mémoire 
du Passé lointain Autobiographique) is a semi-structured interview originally designed 
to assess retrograde amnesia (Piolino, Belliard, Desgranges, Perron, & Eustache, 2003; 
Piolino, Desgranges, et al., 2003; Piolino et al., 2006; Piolino et al., 2000). As the original 
coding method was not available from the authors and not explicitly mentioned in their 
publications, and because our sample comprised only neurotypic subjects, an adaptation of 
the interview was used. The interview was tape-recorded and verbatim transcriptions were 
used to assess the quality of autobiographical recall for three periods2: 1) Childhood (4–11 
years old)3, 2) Adolescence (12–19 years old) and 3) Adulthood (19 and over, except the last 
2  The original interview covers five encoding periods: infancy and adolescence (0–17 years 
old), young adulthood (18–30 years old), adulthood (30 and up), the five last years (except 
the last 12 months) and the last year. These periods were modified here to match the 
expected mean age of our sample (30 to 35 years old). Indeed, the original interview was 
designed to be administered to older persons suffering from severe memory disorders.
3  Also, the onset of the first encoding period was set at four years old to avoid any bias 
in favour of the semantic memory (e.g. fragmentary but coherent memories reported as 
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twelve months). For each period, subjects were asked to retrieve four thematic memories (a 
significant encounter, a school/professional event, a trip, a family event). The full interview 
thus comprises twelve (12) distinct episodes, each coded on four dimensions.
First, the episodicity subscale identifies unique memories of relatively short duration 
that are situated in time and space and filled with phenomenological details, such as 
perceptions, emotions and sensations. In the present study the episodicity subscale was coded 
on a six-point Likert scale. A score of zero (0) was given if the subject was unable to give 
any memory, or gave a general appreciation (e.g. “My childhood was happy”). A score of 
one (1) was given for repeated or extended events (duration of more than twenty-four hours), 
with no spatial and temporal elements, or any vague and overgeneral repeated memories 
(e.g. “We spent every Christmas with my relatives”). A score of two (2) was attributed for 
repeated or extended events that were well situated in time and space, or for unique events 
(e.g. that happened once) that were not situated in time and space. Higher scores were given 
for unique episodes clearly situated in time and space, and remembered with few (3), many 
(4) or exceptional (5) phenomenological details, irrespectively of the length of the narrative. 
The maximal score for the episodicity subscale is sixty (60).
A second subscale assessing self-perspective during retrieval (actor or first-person vs. 
spectator or third-person perspective) is also taken into account in the rating. The memory is 
given a score of between zero and two depending on the self-perspective being in the third 
person (perspective=0), a combination of third and first person perspective (as if the person were 
re-experiencing the memory from within the scene and from outside) (perspective=1), or clearly 
from a first-person point of view, as if the subject was walking the scene and looking at it with 
her own eyes (perspective=2). The maximal score for self-perspective is twenty-four (24).
A third dimension of autobiographical memory assessed by the interview is inspired by 
the R/K paradigm (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985). The awareness was evaluated according 
to the subject’s sense of “knowing” the facts (semantic recall) or truly “remembering” what 
happened (episodic recall). Three aspects of each episode were assessed for awareness: 
factual (what happened), time (when did it happen) and space (where did it happen). The K 
responses were given a score of zero (0), while the R responses were given a score of one (1). 
Maximum score for awareness is 36. Scores on the three subscales (episodicity, perspective, 
awareness) were weighted so that each of the three dimensions contributed equally to the global 
autobiographical memory mean score. The maximum global score for the full interview is 216.
Finally, a separate score of spontaneity of recall is also coded in a reversed relationship 
to the number of cues given to the subject by the interviewer to recall a specific episode, 
instead of a generic one (e.g. for the school event: Do you remember your first day in 
school?). Spontaneity scores range from zero (0) (specific memory generated from four 
cues or more, and non-specific memories, i.e. that have obtained a score of 0, 1 or 2 on the 
episodicity subscale), to four (4) (specific memories generated without any cue or prompt). 
The maximum score for spontaneity is forty-eight (48).
The TEMPau interview appears to be at least as satisfactory comparing to more 
classical episodic tests (Piolino et al., 2006). It has the advantage of considering several 
relevant components of autobiographical memory (episodicity, self-perspective and 
awareness) and a large range of encoding periods (childhood, adolescence and adulthood). It 
also presents good ecological validity. The principal author of the TEMPau interview reported 
over 85% interrater agreement for each subscales (P. Piolino, personal communication). In the 
present research, ninety-six memories (26.7% of the sample) were coded by trained research 
assistants and the first author. The intraclass correlation coefficient obtained for interrater 
agreement (global score) was good (ICC=0.72, p ≤ 0.00) and a consensus was obtained for 
every score. Cronbach’s alphas for the episodicity (α=0.87), perspective (α=0.82), awareness 
(α=0.91) subscales were good, and the global scale is satisfying (α=0.79). The alpha for the 
spontaneity score is also good (α=0.88).Julie Dauphin, Conrad Lecomte, Marc-André Bouchard, 
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The Mental States Rating System (MSRS). In previous work on therapist mental states, as part 
of the global countertransference response, Bouchard and colleagues (Bouchard, Normandin, 
& Seguin, 1995; Lecours, Bouchard, & Normandin, 1995; Normandin & Bouchard, 1993) 
initially distinguished between three basic states of mental activity (reflective, objective-
rational and reactive). Eventually, these distinctions were elaborated to encompass patient 
mental states in psychotherapy, and more generally in verbal productions of any subject 
observed in a psychologically meaningful situation (that is, emotionally charged). The Mental 
States Rating System (Bouchard, Audet, Picard, Carrier, & Milcent, 2001) was further adapted 
and refined and presently differentiates between sixteen different mental states situated on a 
hypothetical continuum from low to high mentalization (e.g. from concrete thinking, low-
defensive, intermediate-defensive, high-defensive, objective-rational to reflective mental 
activity). The sixteen categories were further converted into a dimensional scale with scores 
ranging from 0 to 100 (Bouchard, Boisvert, & Dauphin, 2005). High mentalization profiles 
(predominance of reflectivity) are indicated by global scores above seventy (70), while low 
mentalization profiles (concrete thinking, low defensive activity) are characterized by global 
scores below forty (40). The mean global score was used in analyses.
The MSRS grid may be applied on any clinical interview transcript, with slight interrater 
adjustments regarding specific clinical material. In our project, the MSRS was applied to four 
memories of the TEMPau interview (childhood and adolescence periods, school and family 
episodes). According to clinical evidence, these four memories would presumably be the most 
affectively charged, so maximal mentalization activity would presumably be observed. Two 
undergraduate students in psychology were trained for about thirty hours with the MSRS grid. 
They were blind regarding autobiographical memory codification and subject’s subgroup 
membership (clinical, non-clinical). The intraclass correlation coefficient obtained for 
interrater agreement on MSRS global scores (0–100) was high (ICC=0.88, p<0.000) (N=47 
memories, 39.2% of the sample).
Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ). The CTQ (Bernstein & Fink, 1998) is a 28-item 
self-report questionnaire requesting each participant to retrospectively review his/her personal 
history of childhood abuse and neglect. It includes five subscales (physical abuse, sexual 
abuse, emotional abuse, physical neglect, emotional neglect), each subscale comprising five 
items rated on a five-point Likert scale (0 = never true, 4 = very often true). An additional 
3-item denial/minimisation scale permits the detection of potential false-negative responses 
(i.e. underreporting of trauma). The completion time is about ten minutes. The French version 
of this questionnaire shows internal consistency similar to the original version (Cronbach’s 
alpha ranging from 0.79 to 0.94). Test-retest reliability (three-week interval) is good (Pearson’s 
r ranging from 0.76 to 0.96). A factor analysis performed on the French version yielded a 
factorial structure similar to the original version (Paquette, Laporte, Bigras, & Zoccolillo, 
2004). In our sample, similar reliability scores were found. Cronbach’s alphas were good 
(α=0.77 for physical neglect, α=0.80 for emotional neglect, α=0.82 for physical abuse, α=0.90 
for sexual abuse and α=0.88 for emotional abuse). No cases of under-reporting were detected.
Symptoms Checklist–90 items-Revised (SCL–90-R). The SCL–90-R (Derogatis, 1983) is a 90-
item self-report questionnaire describing psychopathological symptoms (mostly from axis I) 
occurring in the previous week. Each item is scored on a five-point Likert scale (0 = not at 
all, 4 = excessively). The scale yields a Global Severity Index (GSI – mean score on the 
90 items) indicating the impact of symptomatology on daily functioning. A GSI higher than 
0.57 is considered to be an indication of a distress/psychopathology level impeding day-to-
day functioning (Schauenberg & Strack, 1999). In the present research, subscales for specific 
clusters (e.g. depression, anxiety) were not scored. The SCL–90-R shows good internal 
consistency (alpha ranging from 0.77 to 0.90). Test-retest reliability (two-week interval) is 
adequate (Pearson’s r ranging from 0.68 to 0.90) (Peveler & Fairburn, 1990). The French 
version possesses psychometric qualities similar to the original version (Fortin & Coutu-
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Data gathering
Clinical volunteers. The two attending psychiatrists (names of 4th and 5th coauthors 
– to be added in the final version) first introduced the research to patients during individual 
follow-up sessions. If the patient agreed, a twenty-four-hour reflection time was allowed to 
the participant to read the informed consent form. The principal researcher (first author’s 
initials – to be added in the final version) set the appointment for the eligibility interview 
(including screening questionnaires and review of the medical record) following which the 
clinical questionnaires were given to the subject and completed at the hospital. She was 
also responsible for all clinical interviews that followed (TEMPau, SCID-II), which were 
administered on two different days, usually across a two-week period. All TEMPau interviews 
were audio-taped for further codification.
Non-clinical volunteers. The non-clinical participants were recruited by research 
assistants (graduate and undergraduate students in clinical psychology). The same procedure 
was used as with the clinical subgroup with the exception that some interviews (N=9, 30%) 
were performed by research assistants under supervision and after a two-month training 
by the principal researcher. Each interview was then reviewed to ensure the comparability 
of protocols. Two protocols were discarded after this procedure: the first one because the 
interviewer directly elicited the mentalization process during the TEMPau interview and the 
other one due to a recording failure that prevented an accurate transcription.
Results
Before proceeding with data analysis, each variable was examined 
to establish the nature of its observed distribution. The normality of every 
distribution was acceptable. However, challenged homoscedasticity and some 
curvilinear relations were observed within the pool of variables scatter plots. 
Given the sample size and the fact that stringent assumptions of most parametric 
techniques were not met, data were first explored through non-parametric tests 
(Chi-squared tests and Spearman’s rank order correlations). Nonetheless, some 
parametric techniques were possible given their robustness when some specific 
assumptions are slightly violated (e.g. MANOVA) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
All analyses were performed using SPSS (v.16.0).
Preliminary analyses: Relations between gender and clinical variables
In our sample, gender is unrelated either to mentalization (MSRS – high 
vs low global score) [χ2 (1, N = 30) = 1.08, ns] or to autobiographical memory 
(TEMPau – high vs low global score) [χ2 (1, N = 30) = 0.000, ns]. Likewise, 
gender is not related to the CTQ global score [χ2 (1, N = 30) = 0.067, ns] or to 
the presence of an axis II disorder (SCID-II) [χ2 (1, N = 30) = 0.00, ns]. Thus, in 
subsequent analyses male and female subjects were grouped.
Correlations among clinical variables
Spearman’s rank order correlations (rho) were obtained for clinical 
variables global scores (see Table 2)44. Descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 1.
4  Pearson’s correlations (r) lead to similar results.Julie Dauphin, Conrad Lecomte, Marc-André Bouchard, 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Sociodemographic and Clinical Variables 
Total sample
(N=30)1
(M=14, F=16)2
Clinical
(N=16)
(M=8, F=8)2
Non-clinical
(N=14)
(M=6, F=8)2
MS DMS D M S D
(MIN – MAX) (MIN – MAX) (MIN – MAX)
Age (in years) 32.1 9.9 37.2 9.0 26.2 7.5
Education (in years) 12.7 2.0 11.9 2.2 13.6 1.2
Memory (TEMPAU – Global) 169.9 19.8 177.8 13.0 160.9 22.7
(125.0 – 204.0) (142.2 – 196.4) (125.0 – 204.0)
– Episodicity 58.3 6.5 60.2 4.8 56.1 7.5
(45.6 – 72.0) (51.6 – 72.0) (45.6 – 72.0)
– Perspective 48.4 13.5 51.9 12.7 44.4 13.6
(15.0 – 72.0) (21.0 – 72.0) (15.0 – 66.0)
– Consciousness 63.8 5.2 65.6 3.3 61.7 6.2
(50.0 – 72.0) (60.0 – 72.0) (50.0 – 72.0)
– Spontaneity of recall 44.9 3.1 43.9 3.5 46.0 2.1
(36.0 – 48.0) (36.0 – 48.0) (41.0 – 48.0)
Mentalization (MSRS) 62.1 7.5 59.2 8.6 65.3 4.4
(39.3 – 73.1) (39.3 – 66.3) (58.8 – 73.1)
Trauma (CTQ – Global) 45.8 18.6 52.7 21.6 38.0 10.5
(25.0 – 91.0) (26.0 – 91.0) (25.0 – 66.0)
– Emotional abuse 10.8 5.4 12.8 6.0 8.5 3.6
(5.0 – 22.0) (5.0 – 22.0) (5.0 – 18.0)
– Physical abuse 7.20 4.6 9.0 5.7 5.1 0.4
(5.0 – 21.0) (5.0 – 21.0) (5.0 – 6.0)
– Sexual abuse 7.4 4.3 8.6 4.9 6.1 3.2
(5.0 – 24.0) (5.0 – 24.0) (5.0 – 17.0)
– Emotional neglect 12.7 4.9 13.7 5.2 11.5 4.3
(5.0 – 24.0) (5.0 – 24.0) (5.0 – 20.0)
– Physical neglect 8.0 3.9 9.1 4.6 6.7 2.6
(5.0 – 20.0) (5.0 – 20.0) (5.0 – 14.0)
Global Severity Index (SCL–90-R) 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.3
(0.1 – 2.41) (0.1 – 2.41) (0.06 – 1.08)
SCID-II (number of traits) 10.3 7.5 12.2 7.5 8.4 7.3
(0.0 – 28.0) (2.0 – 28.0) (0.0 – 27.0)
SCID-II (number of diagnoses) 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.4
(0.0 – 2.0) (0.0 – 2.0) (0.0 – 2.0)
Cluster A diagnoses 7.0% 14% 0%
Cluster B diagnoses 14.0% 21% 7%
Cluster C diagnoses 21.5% 29% 14%
NOS axis–2 disorders 14.0% 21% 7%
No axis–2 disorder 50.0% 21% 79%
Two axis–2 diagnoses 42.5% 64% 21%
 1  For SCID variables, N=28 (N=14 in the clinical subsample).
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Clinical correlates of mentalization (MSRS).  Contrary to our hypothesis, no 
relation was found between the mentalization mean score and the global quality 
of autobiographical recall (ρ = –.08, ns) or its specific subscales (episodicity, 
self-perspective, awareness) (see Table 2). However, the MSRS is moderately 
and positively linked to the spontaneity of recall (ρ = .41, p < .05). This suggests 
that subjects with higher mentalization capacities retrieve specific memories 
more easily (i.e. with less prompts and cues from the interviewer) than subjects 
presenting with mentalization deficits. Finally, consistent with previously 
established observations (Bouchard et al., 2008), there is a moderate negative 
relationship between the quality of mentalization (MSRS) and childhood trauma 
(total CTQ) (ρ = –.39, p ≤ .05). Mentalization deficits are greater among subjects 
who have suffered from abuse, whether emotional (ρ = –.51, p ≤ .01), physical 
(ρ = –.60, p ≤ .01) or sexual (ρ = –.40, p ≤ .05), but not from emotional or 
physical neglect. Surprisingly, no relation was found between mentalization 
and personality disorders (SCID-II: number of endorsed criteria). However, we 
found that subjects presenting higher mentalization profiles tend to have less 
psychological symptoms, as measured by the SCL–90-R Global Severity Index 
(ρ= –.57, p ≤ .01). Symptoms were also more likely to be present in subjects 
reporting abuse (emotional, physical and sexual), as well as emotional neglect 
(see Table 2).
Clinical correlates of autobiographical memory. Unexpectedly, a moderate 
positive correlation is found between the CTQ global score and the TEMPau 
global score (ρ = .52, p ≤ .01). This suggests a more detailed and specific 
autobiographical recall in subjects reporting higher levels of childhood 
trauma, specifically sexual abuse (ρ = .61, p ≤ .01) and physical neglect (ρ = 
.52, p ≤ .01). Finally, correlations between the CTQ total score and specific 
subscales of the TEMPau suggest that this link might be due essentially to 
the predominance of the actor-like perspective of the subject when he/she 
recalls the episode (ρ = .38, p ≤ .05), reflecting perhaps a lesser degree of 
“distance” from the recalled episode. Also, for sexual abuse (but not physical 
neglect), a richer description of the episode in terms of phenomenological 
details such as sensations, perceptions, cognitions or emotions (episodicity) 
contribute to this relationship (ρ = .40, p ≤ .05). Finally, no relation was 
found between the TEMPau and the SCL–90-R or the SCID-II.Julie Dauphin, Conrad Lecomte, Marc-André Bouchard, 
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Table 2. Spearman’s Correlations (ρ) Among Clinical Scores1
MSRS Autobiographical Memory (TEMPau) SCL SCID Childhood Trauma (CTQ)
Tot. Epis. Csc. Pers. Spo. Tot. EA PA SA EN
MSRS -
AM (Tot.) -.08 -
AM (Epi.) 0.00 .50** -
AM (Csc.) -.04 .65** .43* -
AM (Per.) -.08 .82** .02 .30 -
AM (Spo.) .41* .22 .04 .06 .26 -
SCL–90-R -.57** .27 .11 .04 .24 -.16 -
SCID-II -.15 .10 .03 -.01 .07 .10 .60** -
CTQ (Tot.) -.39* .52** .34 .17 .38* .05 .62** .25 -
CTQ (EA) -.51** .32 .21 -.01 .22 -.25 .59** .15 .87** -
CTQ (PA) -.60** .28 .30 .28 .08 -.25 .38* -.13 .67** .67** -
CTQ (SA) -.40* .61** .40* .34 .47** .00 .51** .03 .80** .62** .62** -
CTQ (EN) -.29 .33 .18 -.05 .30 .15 .44* .18 .90** .80** .55** .58** -
CTQ (PN) -.04 .52** .14 .18 .56** .12 .35 .13 .59** .43* .30 .40* .52**
 1  N=30 for all variables, except SCID-II (N=28)
  MSRS=Mental States Rating System (Mentalization); CTQ: EA=Emotional Abuse; PA=Physical 
Abuse; SA=Sexual Abuse; EN=Emotional Neglect; PN=Physical Neglect; TEMPau: Epis.=Episodicity; 
Csc=Consciousness; Pers.=Self-perspective; Spo.=Spontaneity.
  * Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) ** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Clinical versus Non-clinical subjects: Assessment of Profiles
Given the absence of association found between mentalization and 
autobiographical recall and the unexpected positive correlation of the latter and 
childhood trauma, we proceeded with confirmatory profile analysis. Profile 
analysis was used to determine if the heterogeneity of our sample (clinical 
and non-clinical volunteers) might have had interfered with the observed 
associations. The first step was to determine if the two profiles are equivalent 
(test of parallelism: one-way MANOVA, group X measure). From the profile 
plot (see Figure 1), it is obvious that the two profiles are not parallel (F=3.49, 
p = .02) (see Table 3 for detailed between-subjects effects). Consequently, the 
subsequent tests of level and flatness of the profile analysis procedure were 
not executed. The results show that every clinical variable is significantly 
related to group membership, except for childhood trauma (CTQ: F=3.71, 
p=.07) (see Table 3). This unforeseen result is however likely attributable to 
lack of power5.
Table 3. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects of Group Membership
(Clinical vs. Non-clinical)
Global Scores Fp Partial h2
Memory (TEMPau – Global) 5.11 0.03 0.16
Mentalization (MSRS) 5.22 0.03 0.17
Trauma (CTQ – Global) 3.71 0.07 0.13
Personality Disorders (Number of criteria)2 12.61 0.00 0.33
Symptomatology (SCL–90-R – GSI) 21.5 0.00 0.43
1 N=30 for all variables, except SCID-II (N=28)
5  Independent sample t tests show significant mean differences for all clinical variables 
when the grouping variable is group membership (clinical vs. non-clinical).MENTALIZATION AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 154
Figure 1. Profiles of subjects from clinical and
non-clinical subgroups on global measures
DISCUSSION
As expected, subjects with poor mentalization profiles report higher levels 
of symptomatology, as measured by the SCL–90-R, and higher retrospective 
memories of childhood trauma (especially abuse, whether physical, emotional 
or sexual). However, they prove to have higher capacities to elicit detailed and 
specific autobiographical memories.
In order to closer examine this counterintuitive phenomenon, specific 
memories explicitly recognized as “traumatic” in the subject’s narrations and 
simultaneously presenting high episodic scores (4 or 5) were examined a 
posteriori for their qualitative contents. This represents a pool of 68 memories 
out of 360 (19%). It was found that those “traumatic” memories presenting 
many phenomenological details and that were specific (unique events situated 
in time and place) and recollected in an actor-like perspective were also often 
spontaneously defined by the participants as being typical examples of roles and 
issues within significant relationships (e.g. with caregivers or love mates). Thus, 
our commentary on “traumatic memory” is here strictly limited to interpersonal 
trauma. For example, a subject would add commentaries such as “it was always 
like this with my mother” or “this is the best example of the way we were together”. 
Themes of emotional abuse, failure to take care and betrayal were the most likely 
to be remembered (91% of the time). The prolonged contact with each subject 
during clinical interviews often gave further confirmation to this observation. 
Using a different frame of reference, it would seem indeed that these prototypal 
memories serve as a pictorial synthesis of internalized object relations.Julie Dauphin, Conrad Lecomte, Marc-André Bouchard, 
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The following (partial) transcript, used with the informed consent of 
the participant, is a representative illustration of such prototypal memory. The 
participant is a female in her mid-twenties attending group psychotherapy. Her 
profile on dichotomized variables is typical of what was found in our sample. It 
is characterized by: low education (less than 12 years), low overall mentalization 
capacities (MSRS below 60, with mostly low-level defensive activity), presence 
of at least one DSM-IV personality disorder, moderate to high level of childhood 
trauma (CTQ ≥ 85) and high autobiographical recall (i.e. characterized by high 
episodicity, actor-like perspective and remembered responses).
“Between 12 and 18, of course there was that blow, THE blow I 
received from my father. It changed the course of my life. I cannot 
think of anything else. Oh yes (laughs)! My grandmother was at 
home for a few days. She was quite rich at the time, that old witch, 
and we were not. It was in May, I will always remember... My 
brother decided to look in her things, just for fun, and found about 
five hundred dollars, probably her money for the holidays. He was 
so excited to show me that! I decided to keep twenty dollars. The 
whole idea was to spend the money with my girl friends at the candy 
store. [...] I had just turned twelve. When I came back home later 
that evening I felt a strong emotional strain within the house. I did 
not know why, but it was really tense and I soon figured out why: 
“My father knows”. He indeed confronted me about the money. I 
knew that a “yes” answer would lead to a solid blow, so I lied. All 
I got was ten more minutes free (laughs loudly). I never knew if I 
got punished for the lie or because I stole the money [...] Anyway, I 
remember him being on me, his knee on my chest, hitting me in the 
face and everywhere (coughs). I suddenly felt myself relaxing and 
becoming numb. I told myself: “Go ahead, if you want to hit me, 
hit as hard as you can, I don’t mind”. My mother tried to remove 
my father from me, she cried: “Stop, won’t you stop! You are going 
to kill her!” He finally stopped. My first reaction was to look at 
myself in the mirror; you know how girls are (laughs)! I was cut, my 
lip bled and I had two black eyes (coughs). He kept me grounded 
for a week. Not really to punish me, but to avoid the neighbor’s 
comments. My father, you know... I’m sorry but can I have water 
please? I cannot stop coughing (laughs)! [...]”
This is a typical traumatic memory, although it also illustrates one of the 
few detailed account of physical abuse we had in the sample. The memory 
is well contextualized and filled with many details, including thoughts and 
perceptions; the reader can easily picture the scene. However, noteworthy is 
the fact that the participant adopts toward her memory a quite defensive stance 
characterized by denial and eluding affects (e.g. laughs). Her epic account of 
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factual and sequential reporting) and somatic discharge (coughing). These 
characteristics may have enhanced her subjective tolerance to affects elicited by 
the recall, although affect regulation in itself appears demanding. Thus, one can 
say that what we define as mentalization deficits (at least at the intermediate 
and low levels of defense and of concrete thinking) may in fact support 
autobiographical recall of emotionally distressing (“traumatic”) memories. 
Moreover, spontaneity of recall in subjects presenting a low mentalization 
profile tends to be poorer, suggesting that while memories are available and 
remembered in greater detail (i.e. encoding is good), they might be less easily 
accessible in the first place. Self-exposure to painful incidents may be avoided 
at a conscious level, and so are associated memories that might trigger traumatic 
recall. That is to say, the spontaneity factor measured by the TEMPau interview 
may be compatible with the notion of defensiveness.
At the biological level, it is a well-known fact that declarative episodic 
encoding is enhanced by affect intensity to a certain extent66 due to the effect of 
stress hormones (e.g. cortisol). In this sample, the relation between efficacy of 
autobiographical recall (“episodicity”) and childhood trauma is illustrated by an 
inverted U-shaped curve (not shown here) reminiscent of the relation reported 
by Metcalfe and Jacobs (1996) and Nadel and Jacobs (1998) between declarative 
recall and affect intensity (arousal) present at encoding. However, in this study, 
memories reported by the participants were non-traumatic events eighty percent 
(80%) of the time. Thus, autobiographical memory in general, and not solely 
memory for traumatic episodes, appears better in subjects presenting a personal 
history of childhood trauma. The correlation matrix obtained (see Table 2) 
suggests that the actor-like perspective at encoding prompted by the episode is the 
most relevant memory component to explain this relation. From a phylogenetic 
standpoint, it is certainly more adapted to be able to recognize quickly the 
characteristics of dangerous situations. Persons who have repeatedly been 
abused during childhood may have developed a subtle form of hypervigilance 
that would enhance focal attention and thus increase explicit encoding in most 
interpersonal encounters.
On the other hand, in these participants, emotions appear more or less 
elaborated and integrated to subjective experience (i.e. mentalization is poorer). 
Indeed, subjects may be able to recognize broadly their emotional states at the 
time of the event (e.g. fear, panic), but without further detail. Elaboration and 
symbolization, including for example interpersonal implications and fantasies 
related to traumatic experiences (e.g. “I was betrayed by the one who should 
have protected me”, “I am unworthy, I deserve to be mistreated”, etc.) were 
unlikely to be demonstrated in our sample, which further indicates poor 
mentalization.
6 However, higher affective activation (i.e. disruptive “traumatic” affect intensity) is 
associated to higher plasmatic levels of stress hormones (e.g. cortisol) that may cause 
hippocampal damage, thus lessening the efficacy of declarative encoding and recall. The 
biased distribution of the variable CTQ prevents us from examining this phenomenon.Julie Dauphin, Conrad Lecomte, Marc-André Bouchard, 
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CONCLUSION
The present study aimed at exploring the psychoanalytic concept of 
mentalization in the light of systemic memory models put forward by the 
neurosciences. It was proposed that higher mentalization capacities would lead 
to richer self-representations fluidly associated to one another and available 
for thought and reflexive activity. It was hypothesized that a comparable 
increasing in the ability to recall autobiographical episodes would reflect this 
phenomenon, thus leading to a richer Self concept and identity. It was found 
that mentalization profiles were unrelated to the quality of autobiographical 
recall. Poor mentalization was also related to higher levels of childhood trauma 
(especially abuse) and general symptomatology (as measured by the SCL–
90-R), although we found no relation with axis-II psychopathology (SCID-II). 
Subjects with a personal history of childhood trauma seem to present better 
autobiographical memory (e.g. with more phenomenological details), although 
personal memories are less spontaneously recalled. A qualitative content 
analysis of traumatic interpersonal memories suggested that there seem to be 
a subtle hypervigilance process that takes place, thus keeping the subject in a 
state of interpersonal alertness that support formal encoding, but at the same 
time, by its very nature, prevent any subjective integration and reflexivity. 
Thus, one has to make a conceptual difference between autobiographical 
contents (or memories), defined from a neuropsychological standpoint (e.g. 
Damasio, 1999), from the subject’s autobiography per se, a higher-order 
psychological construct most likely underlying an integrated sense of Self and 
identity. We would argue that a stable sense of Self and identity is based on 
a secure attachment devoid of any abusive and/or traumatic basis. Only then 
the subject has the emotional safety and mental availability to turn inward 
his mental resources to represent, elaborate, symbolize and make sense of his 
subjective experience.
There are some limits to this correlational design. First, the sample is 
small (N=30), which may have prevented the detection of some phenomena and 
introduced some biases. Moreover, the fact that the TEMPau interview appeared 
to have elicited many traumatic memories in a significant number of participants 
underscores the need to control for trauma in future work. This is especially true 
of participants highly motivated to participate in this type of study and who may 
have been more susceptible to use this context as if it were a “psychotherapeutic 
space”. Also, one needs to keep in mind that the MSRS grid was here applied 
for the first time to TEMPau interviews. The specific type of clinical material 
elicited by the interview (e.g. objective descriptions) may have influenced the 
orientation of mental activity toward the lower end of the continuum. Indeed, 
maximum scores obtained in the sample are slightly above seventy (70) and 
would potentially have been higher in the context of more emotionally triggering 
interviews (e.g. Adult Attachment Interview).MENTALIZATION AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 158
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